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Introduction
Human short-term memory is severely limited. While the
existence of such limits is undisputed, there is ample debate
concerning their nature. Miller [1] described the ability to increase
storage capacity by grouping items, or ‘‘chunking’’. He argued
that the span of attention could comprehend somewhere around
seven information items. Chunk structure is recursive; as chunks
may contain other chunks as items: Paragraphs built out of phrases
built out of words built out of letters built out of strokes. This
mechanism is used to explain the cognitive capacity to store a
seemingly endless flux of incoming, pre-registered, information,
while remaining unable to absorb and process new (non-registered)
information in highly parallel fashion.
Miller’s ‘magic number seven’ has been subject of much debate
over the decades. Some cognitive scientists have modeled such
limits by simply using (computer-science) ‘‘pointers’’, or ‘‘slots’’
(e.g, [2,3]—see [4,5] for debate). However, such approaches do
not seem plausible given the massively parallel nature of the brain,
and we believe memory limits are an emergent property of the
neural architecture of the human brain. As Hofstadter put it a
quarter of a century ago [6] : the ‘‘problem with this [slot]
approach is that it takes something that clearly is a very complex
consequence of underlying mechanisms and simply plugs it in a
complex structure, bypassing the question of what those
underlying mechanisms might be.’’(p. 642)
Our objective in this paper is to study these memory limits as
emergent effects of underlying mechanisms. We postulate two
mechanisms previously discussed in the literature. The first is a
mathematical model of human memory brought forth by Kanerva
[7], called Sparse Distributed Memory (SDM). We also presup-
pose, following [8], an underlying mechanism of chunking through
averaging. It is not within the scope of this study to argue for the
validity of SDM as a cognitive model; for incursions on this
broader topic, we refer readers to [9–11], which discuss the
plausibility of this Vector Symbolic Architecture family of models
(in which SDM is contained).
This work, while similar in its mathematical foundations, is
different from previous capacity analyses: In [7], the memory
capacity analysis of SDM relates to its long-term memory
mechanisms, while we study its short–term memory limits. Our
work also differs from that of Plate, in that, regardless of the
number of items presented, the memory will only store (and
subsequently retrieve) a psychologically plausible number of items.
The difference becomes salient in Plate’s own description [12]:
‘‘As more items and bindings are stored in a single HRR the noise
on extracted items increases. If too many associations are stored,
the quality will be so low that the extracted items will be easily
confused with similar items or, in extreme cases, completely
unrecognizable’’(p. 139). Plate is focused on long–term memory;
and we will focus on Miller’s STM limits.
A number of theoretical observations are drawn from our
computations: i) a range of plausible numbers for the dimensions
of the memory, ii) a minimization of a current controversy
between different ‘magic number’ estimates, and iii) potential
empirical tests of the chunking through averaging assumption. We
should start with a brief description of our postulates: i) the SDM,
and ii) chunking through averaging.
Sparse Distributed Memory
The Sparse Distributed Memory (SDM), developed in [7],
defines a memory model in which data is stored in distributed
fashion in a vast, sparsely populated, binary address space. In this
model, (a number of) neurons act as address decoders. Consider the
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N: SDM’s address space is defined allowing 2N possible
locations, where N defines both the word length and the number
of dimensions of the space: the memory holds binary vectors of
length N. In SDM, the data is the same as the medium in which it
is stored (i.e. the stored items are N-bit vectors in N-dimensional
binary addresses).
SDM uses Hamming distance as a metric between any two N-
bit vectors (hereafter memory items, items, elements, or bit-
strings—according to context). Neurons, or hard locations (see
below), in Kanerva’s model, hold random bitstrings with equal
probability of 0’s and 1’s—Kanerva [13,14] has been exploring a
variation of this model with a very large number of dimensions
(around 10000). (With the purpose of encoding concepts at many
levels, the Binary Spatter Code—or BSC—, shares numerous
properties with SDM.) By using the Hamming distance as a
metric, one can readily see that the average distance between any
two points in the space is given by the binomial distribution, and
approximated by a normal curve with mean at N=2 with standard
deviation
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
=2. Given the Hamming distance, and large N, most
of the space lies close to the mean. A low Hamming distance
between any two items means that these memory items are
associated. A distance that is close to the mean N=2 means that
the memory items are orthogonal to each other. This reflects two
facts about the organization of human memory: i) orthogonality of
random concepts, and ii) close paths between random concepts.
Orthogonality of random concepts: the vast majority of concepts is
orthogonal to all others. Consider a non-scientific survey during a
cognitive science seminar, where students asked to mention ideas
unrelated to the course brought up terms like birthdays, boots,
dinosaurs, fever, executive order, x-rays, and so on. Not only are the
items unrelated to cognitive science, the topic of the seminar, but
they are also unrelated to each other.
Close paths between concepts: The organization of concepts seems to
present a ‘small world’ topology–for an empirical approach on
words, for instance, see [15]. For any two memory items, one can
readily find a stream of thought relating two such items (‘‘Darwin
gave dinosaurs the boot’’; ‘‘she ran a fever on her birthday’’; ‘‘isn’t it
time for the Supreme Court to x-ray that executive order?’’ …and so
forth). Robert French presents an intriguing example in which one
suddenly creates a representation linking the otherwise unrelated
concepts of ‘‘coffee cups’’ and ‘‘old elephants’’ [16]. In sparse
distributed memory, any two bitstrings with Hamming distance
around N=4 would be extremely close, given the aforementioned
distribution. And N=4 is the expected distance of an average point
between two random bitstrings.
Of course, for large N (such as N§100), it is impossible to store
all (or even most) of the space—the universe is estimated to carry a
storage capacity of 1090 bits (10120 bits if one considers quantum
gravity) [17]. It is here that Kanerva’s insights concerning
sparseness and distributed storage and retrieval come into play:
220—or a number around one million—physical memory
locations, called hard locations, could enable the representation
of a large number of different bitstrings. Items of a large space
with, say, 21000 locations would be stored in a mere 220 hard
locations—the memory is indeed sparse.
In this model, every single item is stored in several hard
locations, and can, likewise, be retrieved in distributed fashion.
Storage occurs by distributing the item in every hard location
within a certain threshold ‘radius’ given by the Hamming distance
between the item’s address and the associated hard locations.
Different threshold values for different numbers of dimensions are
used (in his examples, Kanerva used 100, 1000 and 10000
dimensions). For N~1000, the distance from a random point of
the space to its nearest (out of the one million) hard locations will
be approximately 424 bits [7] (p.56). In this scenario, a threshold
radius of 451 bits will define an access sphere containing around
1000 hard locations. In other words, from any point of the space,
approximately 1000 hard locations lie within a 451-bit distance.
All of these accessible hard locations will be used in storing
and retrieving items from memory. We therefore define the
function A : f0,1g
N|f1,2,...,Ng.2f0,1g
N
and a hard location
yx [A(x,R) iff yx [f0,1g
N ^ H(x,yx)ƒR, where A defines an
access radius around x of size R (451 if N~1000; H is the
Hamming distance).
A brief example of a storage and retrieval procedure in SDM is
in order: to store an item x at a given (virtual) location f (in sparse
memory) one must activate every hard location within the access
sphere of f (see below) and store the datum in each one. Hard
locations carry N adders, one for each dimension. To store a
bitstring x at a hard location y, one must iterate through the
adders of y: If the i-th bit of x is 1, increment the i-th adder of y,i f
it is 0, decrement it. Repeating this for all hard locations in f’s
access sphere will distribute the information in x throughout these
hard locations.
Retrieval of data in SDM is also massively collective and
distributed: to peek the contents of each hard location, one
computes its related bit vector from its adders, assigning the i-th bit
of y as a 1 or 0 if the i-th adder is positive or negative, respectively
(a coin is flipped if it is 0). Notice, however, that this information in
itself is meaningless and may not correspond to any one specific
datum previously registered. To read from a location x in the
f0,1g
N address space, one must activate the hard locations in the
access sphere of x and gather each related bit vector. The stored
datum will be the majority rule decision of all activated hard
locations’ related bit vectors. If, for the i-th bit, the majority of all
bit vectors is 1, the final read datum’s i-th bit is set to 1, otherwise
to 0. Thus, ‘‘SDM is distributed in that many hard locations
participate in storing and retrieving each datum, and one hard
location can be involved in the storage and retrieval of many data’’
[18] (p. 342).
All hard locations within an access radius collectively point to
an address. Note also that this process is iterative. The address
obtained may not have information stored on it, but it provides
a new access radius to (possibly) converge to the desired original
address. One particularly impressive characteristic of the model
is its ability to simulate the ‘‘tip-of-tongue’’ phenomenon, in
which one is certain about some features of the desired memory
item, yet has difficulty in retrieving it (sometimes being
unable to do so). If the requested address is far enough from
the original item (209 bits if N~1000), iterations of the process
will not decrease the distance—and time to convergence goes to
infinity.
The model is robust against errors for at least two reasons: i) the
contribution of any one hard location, in isolation, is negligible,
and ii) the system can readily deal with incomplete information
and still converge to a previously registered memory item. The
model’s sparse nature dictates that any point of the space may be
used as a storage address, whether or not it corresponds to a hard
location. By using about one million hard locations, the memory’s
distributed nature can ‘‘virtualize’’ the large address space. The
distributed aspect of the model allows such a virtualization.
Kanerva [7] also discusses the biological plausibility of the model,
as the linear threshold function given by the access radius can be
readily computed by neurons, and he suggests the interpretation of
some particular types of neurons as address decoders. Given these
preliminaries concerning the Sparse Distributed Memory, we
should now proceed to our second premise: chunking through
averaging.
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To chunk items, the majority rule is applied to each bit: given v
bitstrings to be chunked, for each of the N bits, if the majority is 1,
the resulting bitstring’s chunk bit is set to 1; otherwise it is 0. In
case of perfect ties (no majority), a coin is flipped.
We have chosen the term ‘chunking’ to describe an averaging
operation, and ‘chunk’ to describe the resulting bitstring, because,
through this operation, the original components generate a new
one to be written to memory. The reader should note, in SDM’s
family of high-dimensional vector models, called Vector Symbolic
Architectures (VSA), the operation that generates composite
structures is commonly known as superposition [10–12].
Obviously, this new chunked bitstring may be closer, in terms of
Hamming distance, to the original elements, than the mean
distance N=2 between random elements (500 bits if N =1000),
given a relatively small v. The chunk may then be stored in the
memory, and it may be used in future chunking operations,
allowing, thus, for recursive behavior. With these preliminaries, we
turn to numerical results in the analysis section.
Analysis
Computing the Hamming distance from a chunk a to
items
Let f~ff 1,f 2,:::,f vg be the set of bitstrings to be chunked into
a new bitstring, a. The first task is to find out how the Hamming
distance is distributed between this averaged a bitstring and the set
f~ff1,f 2,:::,f vg of bitstrings being chunked. This is, as
discussed, accomplished through majority rule at each bit position.
Imagine that, for each separate dimension, a supreme court will
cast a decision with each judge choosing yes (1) or no (0). If there is
an even number of judges, a fair coin will be flipped in the case of
a tie. Given that there are v~DfD votes cast, how many of these
votes will fall in the minority side? (Each minority-side vote adds to
the Hamming distance between an item fi and the average a.)
Note that the minimum possible number of minority votes is one,
and that it may occur with either 3 votes cast or two votes and a
coin flip. If there are two minority votes, they may stem from
either 5 votes or 4 votes and a coin flip, and so forth. We thus have
that, for v votes, the maximum minority number is given by tv=2s
(and the ambiguities between an odd number of votes versus an
even number of votes plus a coin flip are resolved by considering
2tv=2sz1 total votes). This leads to independent Bernoulli trials,
with success factor p~1=2, and the constraint that the minority
view differs from the majority bit vote. Let X be a random variable
with the number of minority votes. Obviously in this case,
P(1ƒXƒtv=2s)~P(Xƒtv=2s{1), hence we have, for v items,
the following cumulative distribution function of minority votes
[19]:
P(Xƒtv=2s{1)~
X tv=2s{1
i~0
2tv=2s
i
  
pi(1{p)
2tv=2s{i~
~
X tv=2s{1
i~0
(2tv=2s)!
i!(2tv=2s{i)!
1
2
2tv=2s
~4{tv=2s X tv=2s{1
i~0
(2tv=2s)!
i!(2tv=2s{i)!
While we can now, given v votes, compute the distribution of
minority votes, the objective is not to understand the behavior of
these minority bits in isolation, i.e., per dimension on the chunking
process. We want to compute the number of dimensions to (in a
psychologically and neurologically plausible way) store and
retrieve around M items—Miller’s number of retrievable
elements—through an averaging operation. Hence we need to
compute the following:
(i) Given a number of dimensions N and a set f of items, the
probability density function of the Hamming distance from
a to the chunked elements fi,
(ii) A threshold T: a number of dimensions in which, if an
element fi’s Hamming distance to a is farther from that
point, then f i cannot be retrieved,
(iii) As DfD grows, how many elements remain retrievable?
Given bitstrings with dimension N, suppose v~DfD elements
have been chunked, generating a new bitstring a. Let HN(a,f i) be
the Hamming distance from the chunked element a to fi, the i-th
element of f. What is the distance from a to elements in f? Here
we are led to N Bernoulli trials with success factor pDfD. Since
N is large, HN(a,f i) for i~f1,2,...,vg can be approximated
by a Normal distribution, we may use m~NpDfD and s~ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
NpDfD(1{pDfD)
p
. To model human short term memory’s limita-
tions, we want to compute a cutoff threshold TN which will
guarantee retrieval of around M items averaged in a and ‘‘forget’’
an item f i if HN(a,f i)wTN—where M is Miller’s limiting
number. Hence to guarantee retrieval of around 95% (2s)o fM
items, we have TN,2s~NpMz2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
NpM(1{pM)
p
, where pM is the
success factor corresponding to M. Note that Cowan [20] has
argued for a ‘‘magic number’’ estimate of 4+1 items—and the
exact cognitive limit is still a matter of debate. The success factor
for 4 (or 5) elements is pf4,5g =.3125; and for 6 (or 7) elements it is
pf6,7g =.34375. By fixing the success factor at plausible values of
M (at {4,5}, or at an intermediary value between {4,5} and {6,7},
or at {6,7}), different threshold values TN,2s are obtained for
varying N, as shown in Table 1. In the remainder of this study, we
use the intermediary success factor pM~:328125~21=64 for our
computations; again without loss of generality between different
estimates of M.
We thus have a number of plausible thresholds and dimensions.
We can now proceed to compute the plausibility range: Despite
the implicit suggestion in Table 1 that any number of dimensions
might be plausible, how does the behavior of these (N,TN,2s)
combinations vary as a function of the number of presented
elements, DfD?
Varying the number of presented items
Consider the case of information overload, when one is
presented with a large set of items. Suppose one were faced with
dozens, or hundreds, of distinct items. It is not psychologically
plausible that a large number of elements should be retrievable.
For an item fi to be impossible to retrieve, the distance between
the averaged item a and f i must be higher than the threshold
point of the corresponding N. When we have an increasingly large
set of presented items, there will be information loss in the
chunking mechanism, but it should still be possible to retrieve
some elements within plausible psychological bounds.
Figure 1(a) shows the behavior of three representative sizes of N:
100, 212 and 1000 dimensions. (100 and 1000 were chosen
because these are described in Kanerva’s original examples of
SDM.) N~212 has shown to be the most plausible number of
dimensions, preserving a psychologically plausible number of items
after presentations of different set sizes. It is clear that N~100
quickly diverges, retaining a high number of items in a chunk (as
the number of presented items grows). Conversely, if N~1000,
the number of preserved memory items rapidly drops to zero, and
STM Limits on a Sparse Distributed Memory
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all—a psychologically implausible development. Figure 1(b) zooms
in to illustrate behavior over a narrower range of N-values and a
wider range of presented items. Varying the number of presented
items and computing the number of preserved items (for a number
of representative dimensions) yields informative results. Based on
our premises, experiments show that to appropriately reflect the
storage capacity limits exhibited by humans, certain ranges of N
must be discarded. With too small a number of dimensions, the
model will retrieve too many items in a chunk. With too large a
number of dimensions, the model will retrieve at most one or
two—perhaps no items at all. This is because of the higher number
of standard deviations involved in the dimension sizes: for
N~100, the whole space has 20 standard deviations, and
TN~100,2s~42:2 is less than 2 standard deviations below the
mean—which explains why an ever growing number of items is
‘‘retrieved’’ (i.e., high probability of false positives). For N~1000,
the space has over 63 standard deviations, and TN~1000,2s~
357:82, is around 8.99 standard deviations below the mean. There
is such a minute part of the space below TN~1000,2s that item
retrieval is virtually impossible.
With an intermediary success factor pM between p4 and p7
established by the cognitive limits 4 and 7, we have computed the
number of dimensions of a SDM as lying in the vicinity of 212
dimensions. Variance is minimized when N~212—and retrieval
results hold psychologically plausible ranges even when hundreds of
items are presented (i.e., the SDM would be able to retrieve from a
chunk no more than nineitems and at least one or two, regardless of
how many items are presented simultaneously). Finally, given that
this work rests upon the chunking through averaging postulate, in
the next section we will argue that the postulated mechanism is not
only plausible, but also empirically testable.
Results and Discussion
The chunking through averaging postulate
Consider the assumption of chunking through averaging. We
propose that it is plausible and worthy of further investigation, for
three reasons.
First, it minimizes the current controversy between Miller’s
estimations and Cowan’s. The disparity between Miller’s 7+2 or
Cowan’s 4+1 observed limits may be a smaller delta than what is
argued by Cowan. Our ‘‘chunking-through-averaging’’ premise
may provide a simpler, and perhaps unifying, position to this
debate. If chunking 4 items has the same probability as 5 items,
and chunking 6 items is equivalent to chunking 7 items, one may
find that the ‘magic number’ constitutes one cumulative
probability degree (say, 4-or-5 items) plus or minus one (6-or-7
items).
A mainstream interpretation of the above phenomenon may be
that, as with any model, SDM is a simplification; an idealized
approximation of a presumed reality. Thus, one may see it as
insufficiently complete to accurately replicate the details of true
biological function due to, among other phenomena, inherent
noise and spiking neural activity. In this case, one would interpret
it as a weakness, or an inaccuracy inherent to the model. An
alternative view, however improbable, may be that the model is
accurate in this particular aspect, in which case, the assumption
minimizes the current controversy between Miller’s estimations
and Cowan’s.
The success factors computed above show that for either 4 or 5
items, we have p~:3125, while for 6 or 7 items we have
p~:34375. If we assume an intermediary value of p—which is
reasonable, due to noise or lack of synchronicity in neural
processing—the controversy vanishes. We chose to base our
experiments on the mean value (p~21=64~:328125), and the
results herein may be adapted to other estimates as additional
experiments settle the debate.
Moreover, a chunk a tends to be closer to the fi chunked items
than these items are between themselves. For example, with
DfD~5 and N~212, the Hamming distance between a chunk and
a random item is drawn from a distribution with m~N21=64 and
s~(
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
903
p
)=64; in here, from the point of view of the
chunked item a, the closest 1% of the space lies at 53 bits, while
99% of the space lies at 84 bits. Contrast this with the distances
between any two random, orthogonal, items, which are drawn
from m~N=2 and s~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
=2: from the point of view of a random
item, the closest 1% of the space lies at 89 bits, while 99% of the
space lies at 122. This disparity reflects the principles of
orthogonality between random concepts and of close paths between concepts
(or small worlds [15]): the distance between 2 items from any 5 is
large, but the distance to the average of the set is small. Of
course, as DfD grows, the distance to a also grows (since
limDfD?? pDfD~1=2), and items become irretrievable. One thing
is clear: with 5 chunked items, the chance of retrieving a false
positive is minute.
Finally, the assumption of chunking through averaging is
empirically testable. Psychological experiments concerning the
difference in ability to retain items could test this postulate. The
assumption predicts that (4, 5) items, or more generally that
(2v,2vz1) for integer vw0 will be registered with equal
probability. It also predicts how the probability of 2vz2 retained
items should drop in relation to 2vz1 if vw0. This is
counterintuitive and can be measured experimentally. Note,
however, two qualifications: first, as chunks are hierarchically
organized, these effects may be hard to perceive in experimental
settings. One would have to devise an experimental setting with
Table 1. Threshold values.
N
TN,2s
(M~4 or 5)
TN,2s
(intermediary
value)
TN,2s
(M~6 or 7)
64 27.42 28.51 29.6
128 50.49 52.62 54.75
192 72.85 76.01 79.16
256 94.83 99.02 103.2
320 116.58 121.8 126.99
384 138.17 144.4 150.61
448 159.62 166.88 174.11
512 180.98 189.25 197.49
576 202.25 211.54 220.8
640 223.45 233.76 244.03
704 244.6 255.92 267.2
768 265.69 278.02 290.32
832 286.74 300.09 313.4
896 307.75 322.11 336.43
960 328.72 344.1 359.43
1024 349.66 366.05 382.4
100 40.52 42.2 43.87
1000 341.82 357.82 373.79
10000 3217.7 3375.16 3532.49
Thresholds TN,2s given plausible success factors and dimension combinations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015592.t001
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neither combinations of such chunks, nor combinations of their
constituting parts. The final qualification is that, as v grows, the
aforementioned probability difference tends to zero. Because of
the conjunction of these qualifications, this effect would be hard to
perceive on normal human behavior.
Figure 1. Preserved items as a function of v; selected values of N.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015592.g001
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Numerous cognitive scientists model the limits of human short-
term memory through explicit ‘‘pointers’’ or ‘‘slots’’. In this paper
we have considered the consequences of a short-term memory
limit given the mechanisms of i) Kanerva’s Sparse Distributed
Memory, and ii) chunking through averaging. Given an
appropriate choice for the number of dimensions of the binary
space, we are able to model chunks that limit active memory’s
storage capacity, while allowing the theoretically endless recursive
association of pre-registered memory items at different levels of
abstraction (i.e., chunks may be chunked with other chunks or
items, indiscriminately [1,21]). This has been pointed out in [22],
however, in here we use the short-term memory limitations as a
bounding factor to compute plausible ranges for N.
Some observations are noteworthy. First, our work provides
plausible bounds on the number of dimensions of a SDM—we
make no claims concerning Kanerva’s recent work (e.g., [14]).
Given our postulates, it seems that 100 dimensions is too low a
number, and 1000 dimensions too high. In our computations,
assuming pM~21=64, variance of the number of items retained
(as a function of the number of presented items and at least one
retrievable item) was minimized at 212 dimensions. This value was
chosen as our optimal point of focus for it provided stable,
psychologically plausible behavior for a wide range of set sizes. We
have concentrated on the SDM and chunking through averaging
postulates, yet future research could also look at alternative neural
models; for it is certain that the brain does not use explicit slots or
pointers when items are chunked. One can reasonably argue: what
good can come from replacing one magic number with another?
There are two potential benefits: first, by fixing parameter N,w e
can restrict the design space of SDM simulations and ensure that a
psychologically plausible number of items is chunked. Another
advantage is theoretical: the number 212 suggests that we should
look for neurons that seem to have, or respond majoritarily to,
such a number of active inputs in their linear threshold function.
Of course, a single 212 bit vector in SDM does not encode
meaningful content at all. The existence of a bitstring can only be
meaningful in relation to other bitstrings close to it. Consider, for
instance, an A4 sheet of paper, of size 210mm6297mm
(8.3in611.7in). A 120061200 dots-per-inch printer holds less
than 228 potential dots in an entire sheet. While the space of
possible black and white printed A4 sheets is a very large set of
2139838400 possible pages, the vast majority of them, rather like the
library of Babel, are composed of utter gibberish. Any single dot
needs only 28 bits to be described, and because the dots usually
cluster into strokes, chunks can be formed. Moreover, because
strokes cluster to form fonts, which cluster to form words, which
cluster to form phrases and paragraphs; combinations of large sets
of 212 dimensional bitstrings can encode the meaningful content
of pages and books—provided those items have been previously
chunked in the reader’s mind. Without chunks there can be no
meaning; this paragraph, translated to Yanomami (assuming that’s
possible), would become unreadable to its intended audience and
to its authors.
Sparse Distributed Memory holds a number of biologically and
psychologically plausible characteristics. It is associative, allowing
for accurate retrieval given vague or incomplete information
(which is relevant given the potential for asynchronous behavior
[23]); it is readily computable by neurons; it seems suitable for
storage and retrieval of low-level sensorimotor information [24], it
is a plausible model of the space of human concepts, and it exhibits
a phenomenon strikingly similar to the tip-of-the-tongue situation.
With the results presented herein, sparse distributed memory also
reflects the natural limits of human short-term memory.
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